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INTRODUCTION
I seriously wonder how many men married five, 
four years would have the strength to walk away
without inflicting some corporal punishment.1
—Hon. Robert E. Cahill
Judge Robert E. Cahill uttered this statement during his sentenc-
ing of Kenneth Peacock, who was convicted of voluntary manslaughter
for killing his wife after catching her in bed with another man.2 Judge
Cahill ultimately sentenced Peacock to eighteen months in prison.3
Although Judge Cahill admitted that he personally believed Peacock’s
actions were justified by his wife’s indiscretions, the Judge felt that his
hands were tied, and that punishment was legally required.4
The statements made by Judge Cahill in the Peacock case reveal
the male bias pervasive throughout the American legal system and,
more specifically, in the law of voluntary manslaughter, which is
grounded in the traditional notion of men’s crimes.5 Male bias can be
seen in the many layers of the male-dominated legal system, from the
prevalence of male decision-makers,6 to the inherent sex-bias in jury
1. Tamar Lewin, What Penalty for a Killing in Passion?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1994,
at A18.
2. Peacock, a long-distance trucker, came home early from a run and found his wife
of five years in bed with another man. Peacock chased the man away, and, after hours of
“drinking and arguing, shot his wife in the head with a hunting rifle.” Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. Judge Cahill, who has since refused to discuss the case, originally said that al-
though he wished he did not have to subject Peacock to such a sentence, he knew he had
to “ ‘to make the system honest.’ ” Id. (quoting Hon. Robert E. Cahill).
5. See Wendy Keller, Disparate Treatment of Spouse Murder Defendants, 6 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 255, 262 (1996) (arguing that the way in which current legal
doctrines are “grounded in traditional notions of men’s crimes” makes it hard to accom-
modate the female perspective and experience).
6. A.B.A. COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A CURRENT GLANCE OF WOMEN IN
THE LAW 3 (Nov. 13, 2009) [hereinafter CURRENT GLANCE OF WOMEN], http://www.abanet.
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selection,7 to the male-oriented laws,8 and to the lingering influence of
the “reasonable man” standard. This institutionalized male bias is a
product of a larger male-dominated society that promotes gender ste-
reotyping and categorization.9 The effects of gender bias on the concept
of reasonableness is particularly stark in cases like Peacock that in-
volve killing in the heat of passion.10
Male defendants who kill in the heat of passion often find protec-
tion in the doctrine of voluntary manslaughter.11 The flexible sentenc-
ing associated with voluntary manslaughter emerged in the common
law as an alternative to the rigidity of murder sentences in order to
afford leniency to males who have committed violent acts in response
to provocation.12 Today, voluntary manslaughter continues to accom-
modate men who kill their wives in the heat of passion, but not women
who kill their husbands for the same reason,13 due to the gender bias
inherent in the concepts of objective and subjective reasonableness.14
An important aspect of the modern definition of voluntary man-
slaughter is the focus on the reasonableness of the perpetrator’s
actions.15 Although many crimes require the use of a basic standard of
org/women/CurrentGlanceStatistics2009.pdf. Women are underrepresented in both state
and federal courts. In 2009, women made up only twenty-seven percent of U.S. Circuit
Court Judges, twenty-five percent of U.S. District Court Judges, and thirty-two percent
of justices on state courts of last resort. Id.
7. Cameron McGowan Currie & Aleta M. Pillick, Sex Discrimination in the Selection
and Participation of Female Jurors: A Post-J.E.B. Analysis, 35 JUDGES J. 1, 2, 4 (1996).
8. Keller, supra note 5, at 262.
9. Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Shelley J. Correll, Unpacking the Gender System: A
Theoretical Perspective on Gender Beliefs and Social Relations, 18 GENDER & SOC’Y 510,
515 (2004).
10. An expert on domestic violence was quoted as stating that, through its Peacock
decision, “ ‘[t]he court is saying that [killing in the heat of passion] is socially understand-
able for a man to do.’ ” Lewin, supra note 1, at A18 (quoting Elizabeth Schneider).
11. The notion that the law treats men who kill in the heat of passion less harshly than
others who commit homicide is underscored by Peacock’s extremely light eighteen-month
sentence. Id.
12. See, e.g., Bartram v. State, 364 A.2d 1119, 1152-53 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976)
(discussing the difference between first-degree murder and homicides committed in “hot-
blooded fury” and stating that the latter “may lower the blameworthiness from the murder
level to the manslaughter level”); see also Alafair S. Burke, Equality, Objectivity, and
Neutrality, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1043, 1061-62 (2005) (reviewing CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND
THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003)) (explaining
that “[b]y recognizing that a reasonable heat of passion could negate the malice required
for murder,” the law of voluntary manslaughter saved male defendants who killed while
engaged in brawls from the death sentence).
13. Indeed, just “a day after the [Peacock] judge acted, another Baltimore judge handed
down a three-year sentence to a woman who pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter for
killing her husband after 11 years of abuse.” Lewin, supra note 1, at A18.
14. In general, juries think it is understandable that a man will act out violently
against his wife when he learns about her adultery. Id.
15. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2(a) (West 2010) (adopting a definition of voluntary
manslaughter that judges the adequacy of provocation by comparing the actor’s response
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reasonableness, the way in which the “reasonable man” standard is
applied in cases of voluntary manslaughter is particularly harsh for
women perpetrators who fall victim to the genderized reasonable
man.16 When the reasonableness standard is objectively applied, it is
the image of the stereotypical male that is invoked, and strict gender
divides ensure that women are seen as the excluded “other.” 17 Volun-
tary manslaughter originated to accommodate men and has adapted
accordingly.18 Today, women are still viewed as outsiders who find
little place and protection in the law of voluntary manslaughter.19
Conversely, when reasonableness is subjectively applied by states
that follow the Model Penal Code’s approach,20 and the effect that a
defendant’s gender has on the reasonableness of his or her actions is
considered, women defendants fall victim to societal stereotypes and
are judged against prescribed female gender roles.21 In cases involving
voluntary manslaughter, reasonableness is a double-edged sword for
women who are not accommodated in the traditional male conception
of reasonable provocation, and who also face discrimination at the
hands of a subjective reasonable standard plagued by stereotypical
gender roles.22
One thing that is striking is the lack of studies that focus on the
gender element of crimes committed in the heat of passion.23 Further,
scholars have been highly critical of the narrow scope of those studies
to that of the objective reasonable person), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1962) (taking
a highly subjective approach to reasonableness by focusing on the actual viewpoint of
the defendant).
16. Burke, supra note 12, at 1061-62 (discussing the disparate impact of the provoca-
tion defense on women). Current defense law is based on the reasonableness standard,
and, in most jurisdictions, self-defense is justified if the defendant reasonably believed that
the force was necessary to prevent an imminent threat of unlawful physical force. Richard
Klein, Race and the Doctrine of Self Defense: The Role of Race in Determining the Proper
Use of Force to Protect Oneself, 4 J. RACE GENDER ETHNICITY 30, 30 (2009).
17. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 636 (1983) (“[O]bjectivity—the nonsituated, univer-
sal standpoint, whether claimed or aspired to—is a denial of the existence or potency of
sex inequality that tacitly participates in constructing reality from the dominant point
of view.”).
18. See Burke, supra note 12, at 1061-62 (discussing how the common law expanded
to recognize a category of provocation based on a man witnessing his wife’s adultery).
19. See Keller, supra note 5, at 255 (pointing out that women who kill an intimate
partner or spouse often receive harsher prison sentences).
20. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962).
21. Keller, supra note 5, at 272.
22. Id. at 268 (“ ‘[M]yths, biases, and stereotypes about women pervade the judicial
decision-making process and often affect the outcomes of cases.’ ”) (quoting CYNTHIA K.
GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 191 (1989)). Women are also frequently targets for
“ ‘victim blaming.’ ” Id.
23. See id. at 258 (noting that the studies regarding such violent crimes often do not
take into account factors that are frequently associated with sex).
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that do exist.24 Although some studies of sex disparities in sentencing
have concluded that, generally, women spend less time in prison than
men who have committed identical crimes, these studies fail to account
for legally relevant and important variables, such as a defendant’s pri-
or criminal record, or the severity of the offense.25 Such variables are
significant, in light of the fact that approximately eighty percent of
women who kill or assault their partners have no prior criminal
record. This alone may explain why women offenders generally receive
lesser sentences than men who kill or assault their partners.26 Cur-
rently, the extent to which women are actually penalized by the male
bias pervasive in both the objective and subjective reasonableness
standards in the context of voluntary manslaughter is unclear.27 Com-
prehensive studies are therefore needed to present a clearer picture of
the discriminatory application of the crime of voluntary manslaughter.
Policymakers need to re-examine the statutory definitions of vol-
untary manslaughter and crimes committed in the heat of passion.
The gender bias inherent in the concept of reasonableness as it relates
to voluntary manslaughter must be exposed from behind the guise of
objectivity. Though examining statutes and the concept of reasonable-
ness is a start, the true problem is that prevailing sex stereotypes
make it reasonable for a man to kill his wife to “defend his honor,” but
treat a wife acting violently for the same reasons as completely irra-
tional.28 Ultimately, society must recognize that this unequal power
24. See id. at 257-58 (discussing the shortcomings of the available studies, which fail
to control for important variables or to adequately define “violence”); Emily L. Miller, Com-
ment, (Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter, Gender, and the Model Penal Code,
50 EMORY L.J. 665, 667 (2001) (explaining that intimate violence studies that do exist
fail to identify the instances in which the defendant successfully claimed voluntary
manslaughter).
25. Keller, supra note 5, at 257. For example, a 1995 study by the U.S. Department
of Justice that reported that “wife” defendants were less likely to be convicted and to
receive severe sentences when compared to “husband” defendants seemingly failed to take
into account the individual defendant’s prior criminal records. PATRICK A. LANGAN &
JOHN M. DAWSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPOUSE MURDER DEFENDANTS IN LARGE
URBAN COUNTIES, 2 (Sept. 1995), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf
/SPOUSMUR.PDF.
26. Geris Serran & Philip Firestone, Intimate Partner Homicide: A Review of the
Male Proprietariness and the Self-Defense Theories, 9 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV.
1, 10 (2004).
27. For cases involving female defendants who killed in the heat of passion, see Hoyt
v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Scroggs v. State, 94 S.E.2d 28 (Ga. Ct. App. 1956); Bartram
v. State, 364 A.2d 1119 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976); Harris v. State, 152 S.W.3d 786 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004).
28. See Keller, supra note 5, at 262 (contending that women usually kill men they are
intimately involved with “defensively,” whereas men kill their wives as “an offensive act”).
Because legal doctrines are “grounded in traditional notions of men’s crimes,” they often
fail “to accommodate a woman’s perspective and experiences.” Id.
2010] INHERENT UNREASONABLENESS OF THE CONCEPT OF REASONABLENESS 253
structure within intimate relationships serves to encourage spousal
abuse and intimate violence.29
Part I of this Note, provides a brief introduction into the discrim-
inatory facets of America’s male-dominated legal system, focusing on
the role of judges and juries within that system. This information will
serve as the backdrop for Part II, which discusses the history and ori-
gins of voluntary manslaughter before considering modern develop-
ments in the law. This section also breaks down the legal elements of
voluntary manslaughter, comparing state statutes to the language of
the Model Penal Code. Part III focuses on the “reasonableness” aspect
of voluntary manslaughter, and on demonstrating how tests of reason-
ableness—whether objectively or subjectively applied—are actually
gendered in nature. Finally, the Conclusion proposes legal and societal
reforms to help remedy the existing gender problems pervasive in the
law of voluntary manslaughter.
I. THE MALE-DOMINATED LEGAL SYSTEM
From the top down, the American legal system is male-dominated
and has been shaped by male influences.30 The system is epitomized
by the majority presence at the bench of male judges.31 These judges
implement legal doctrines enacted by male legislators32 and “grounded
in traditional notions of men’s crimes.” 33 That this system fails to
accommodate the female perspective and experience may also function
to affect sentencing determinations.34 The high percentage of male
homicide perpetrators and victims indicates that homicide itself is an
29. See Serran & Firestone, supra note 26, at 10 (focusing on how feelings of
possessiveness and the male need to control his partner encourages abuse and increases
the risk of homicide within intimate relationships).
30. See Sharyn L. Roach Anleu, Critiquing the Law: Themes and Dilemmas in Anglo-
American Feminist Legal Theory, 19 J.L. & SOC’Y 423, 423 (1992) (arguing that the
“Anglo-American legal systems . . . favour men’s interests and actually reinforce male
domination”).
31. See CURRENT GLANCE OF WOMEN, supra note 6, at 2 (providing statistics showing
the disparity between male and female judges at both the state and federal levels).
32. Women currently hold less than seventeen percent of the seats in the 111th U.S.
Congress, and at the state level, women make up less than twenty-five percent of elected
legislators. Facts About Women Legislators, NAT’L FOUND. FOR WOMEN LEGISLATORS,
http://www.womenlegislators.org/women-legislator-facts.php (last visited Nov. 22,
2010). For more information on female representation at both the state and federal
level, see, Facts on Women Officeholders, Candidates, and Voters,  RUTGERS UNIV. CTR.
FOR AM. WOMEN & POLS., http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/index.php (last visited
Nov. 22, 2010).
33. Keller, supra note 5, at 262.
34. Id.
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overwhelmingly male act.35 Additionally, the circumstances under
which men and women kill and the identity of their victims tend to
vary along gender lines.36
Throughout American legal history, the law of homicide has pri-
marily focused on the control and punishment of male violence because
the vast majority of homicide defendants are male.37 Furthermore,
“criminal law has been developed by male common law judges, codified
by male legislators, enforced by male police officers, and interpreted by
male judges and juries.” 38 Voluntary manslaughter is no exception;
the legal standards that define “adequate provocation” and “reason-
ableness” reflect a very male view of the concept of justifiable homi-
cidal violence.39
As demonstrated by Judge Cahill’s statement included at the
beginning of this Note,40 male common law judges responsible for
developing the law bring with them their male perspectives, which are
often influenced by societal gender stereotypes.41 In spousal-killing
cases, judges may ultimately treat male defendants with increased
leniency, based on the perception that unfaithful wives goad their hus-
bands into the act of killing through their improprieties.42 This
35. “In 1984, eighty-seven percent of those arrested in the United States for homicide
and seventy-five percent of homicide victims were male.” Laurie J. Taylor, Provoked
Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33
UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1679 (1986). A 2007 Department of Justice Report corroborates those
statistics: in 2005, men were nearly ten times more likely than women to commit murder.
Homicide Trends in the U.S.: Trends by Gender, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, [hereinafter Homicide Trends], http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
homicide/gender.cfm (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). Additionally, men were murdered at
nearly four times the rate of women in 2005. Id.
36. Women rarely kill, but, when they do kill, they most often kill male intimates.
Taylor, supra note 35, at 1680-81. According to the Department of Justice, “[b]oth male
and female offenders are more likely to target male victims than female victims.” Homicide
Trends, supra note 35. It should be noted that statistics have long shown that when
women kill intimates, they do so as a measure of self-defense in response to beatings.
Taylor, supra note 35, at 1698. This propensity is often connected to Battered Women’s
Syndrome, a subject relevant to the discussion of female homicide and voluntary
manslaughter but outside the scope of this Note. For further information about
Battered Women’s Syndrome, see Daniel D. Angiolillo, Seeking Truth, Preserving
Rights—Battered Women’s Syndrome/Extreme Emotional Distress: Abuse Excuse or
Syndrome Defense, 24 PACE L. REV. 253 (2003); Alene Kristal, Note, You’ve Come a Long
Way, Baby: The Battered Women’s Syndrome Revisited, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 111
(1991); Pamela Posch, Comment, The Negative Effects of Expert Testimony on the Battered
Women’s Syndrome, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 485 (1998).
37. Homicide Trends, supra note 35.
38. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1681.
39. Id. at 1679.
40. Lewin, supra note 1, at A18.
41. Id. (discussing how Judge Cahill’s statements reflect the male gender perspective
in heat-of-passion killings).
42. Keller, supra note 5, at 268.
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deserving-victim concept works in conjunction with another model
based on female stereotypes: the evil-woman hypothesis, which pre-
dicts that male judges will treat female defendants more harshly,
based on the view that deviant women are an anomaly to the image of
the stereotypical “virtuous woman.”43 Although over-simplified, these
kinds of gender stereotypes can be highly influential during sen-
tencing, and may ultimately lead to the development of prejudicial
case law.44
Another factor that leads to the dominance of the male perspective
is sex discrimination in jury selection, which results in the wrongful
exclusion of female jurors (and their female perspectives) from partici-
pating in the judicial process.45 This is problematic because, ultimately,
jurors are given the power to determine the guilt or innocence of a
defendant in most cases involving voluntary manslaughter.46 A lack of
female jurors can have dire consequences for the defendant.47 Due to
the lack of comprehensive studies on the subject, though, it is unclear
whether female and male jurors do decide cases involving murder com-
mitted in the heat of passion differently, and whether those decisions
are affected by the defendant’s gender.48 What is clear, is that, given
the responsibility entrusted to jurors to decide whether voluntary man-
slaughter is appropriate based on the facts of a case,49 the stakes are
too high for criminal defendants’ futures to have to depend on the
gender makeup of a jury.
Jurors themselves are discriminated against in the jury
selection process.50 Yet, when making decisions, juries as a whole
seem to rely on gender stereotypes that dictate that it is reasonable for
43. Id. at 270. Put another way, the admittedly simplistic “ ‘evil woman’ hypothesis
predicts that judges will view a convicted female as a ‘fallen woman’ and throw the book
at her in disgust.” Id. (citation omitted).
44. Many feminist groups believe that sentencing in situations similar to that in the
Peacock case “reflect a widespread acceptance of male violence against women.” Lewin,
supra note 1, at A18.
45. Currie & Pillick, supra note 7, at 6. There was a time when juries were made up
almost entirely of men; women were not required to serve on juries. See Hoyt v. Florida,
368 U.S. 57, 65 (1961) (citing a Florida statute that provided that no woman would be
required to perform jury service, though she could volunteer for it).
46. See People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 780 (Cal. 1976) (“ ‘In the present condition of our
law it is left to the jurors to say whether or not the facts and circumstances in evidence are
sufficient to lead them to believe that the defendant did . . . commit his offense under a
heat of passion.’ ” (quoting People v. Logan, 164 P. 1121, 1122 (Cal 1917))).
47. See Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 65 (holding that a woman’s conviction for killing her
husband in the heat of passion by an all-male jury did not violate her rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
48. See Currie & Pillick, supra note 7, at 41 (discussing “the shortcoming of all gender-
difference [jury] studies,” including the failure to take into account factors other than
gender, such as race, age, income, and religion).
49. Berry, 556 P.2d at 780.
50. Currie & Pillick, supra note 7, at 6.
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a man to react hastily when he learns about his wife’s acts of adul-
tery.51 This suggests that gender stereotypes condoning male domi-
nance and aggression are so pervasive that they are internalized by
both male and female jurors.52
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
Voluntary manslaughter first emerged in the sixteenth century to
protect men who engaged in the common practice of defending their
honor through physical attack or mutual violence from the death
penalty.53 Eventually, the common law expanded “to include the ‘sight
of adultery’ ” as a category of provocation,54 mitigating the punishment
for men who killed their adulterous wives.55 The definition of protect-
ing one’s honor was merely expanded to incorporate societal norms
dictating that a “respectable” man would not only be inclined to “phys-
ically retaliate against any perceived affront,” 56 but that he should also
be expected to retaliate against any trespass on his most precious
property: his wife.57
The expansion of the doctrine of provocation to include discovering
adultery reflects the historical treatment of wives as the property of
their husbands.58 As noted by the English House of Lords, “jealousy
is the rage of a man, and adultery is the highest invasion of prop-
erty. . . . [A] man cannot receive a higher provocation.” 59 Today,
51. See Lewin, supra note 1, at A18 (noting how jurors often flinch from convicting of
murder a man who kills his wife after finding her in bed with another man).
52. See Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Framed Before We Know It: How Gender Shapes Social
Relations, 23 GENDER & SOC’Y 145, 145 (2009) (asserting that gender provides one of
culture’s “primary frame[works] for organizing social relations”); Judith Taylor, The
Problem of Women’s Sociality in Contemporary North American Feminist Memoir, 22
GENDER & SOC’Y 705, 711 (2008) (contending that, through their memoirs, feminist
thinkers “convey the belief that women treat each other poorly because they have been
emotionally marred by . . . gender socialization”).
53. Burke, supra note 12, at 1061-62. In the early days of the doctrine of voluntary
manslaughter, the law of provocation saved male defendants who were torn between
upholding the code of honor that dictated that men should retaliate when attacked or in-
sulted and the prospect of receiving the death penalty in cases of murder. Miller, supra
note 24, at 671.
54. Burke, supra note 12, at 1062.
55. See Rowland v. State, 35 So. 826, 827 (Miss. 1904) (explaining that a husband is
justified in killing either the man who he catches in bed with his wife or his wife). Finding
“no difference in the degree of the crime, whether the betrayed husband slays the faithless
wife or her guilty paramour,” the court that held both instances constitute manslaughter,
not murder. Id.
56. Miller, supra note 24, at 671.
57. See Burke, supra note 12, at 1062 (“[P]rovocation law reflected not just a judicial
understanding of the physical reactions of men, but prevalent norms about women as
male property.”).
58. Burke, supra note 12, at 1062.
59. Regina v. Mawgridge, 84 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1115 (Q.B. 1707).
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though women are no longer legally viewed as property of their hus-
bands, “the doctrine of voluntary manslaughter continues to perpetu-
ate a violent form of male subordination of women.” 60
In today’s society, where duels for honor have been eradicated, the
typical paradigm for the use of voluntary manslaughter is exemplified
by the facts of the Peacock case: an unsuspecting husband comes home
and catches his wife in bed with another man.61 Blinded by rage, he
retaliates against her in a way that ultimately proves fatal for her.62
The wife’s only role within this paradigm is as the blameworthy vic-
tim.63 This “presents a further substantive barrier to judging fairly the
culpability of female homicide defendants” who claim that their
violent acts should receive the protection of the doctrine of volun-
tary manslaughter.64
It is not just the typical voluntary manslaughter paradigm that
has been slow to accommodate women; the legal imposition of that
doctrine has been equally slow in expanding to protect women and still
fails to provide gender parity.65 In 1946, 275 years after English courts
first recognized what they called the “defense of provocation,” 66 an
English court finally stated that women who kill their adulterous
husbands can avail themselves of the provocation defense.67
The American common law doctrine of voluntary manslaughter is
also characterized by its historical and continued lack of protection for
women.68 Historically, the law specifically defined the legally permissi-
ble categories of adequate provocation in cases of voluntary man-
slaughter to include adultery, mutual combat, false arrest, and violent
60. See Miller, supra note 24, at 667-68 (arguing that although women have achieved
near gender parity in many areas of their lives, they continue to face subordination
through liberal application of the doctrine of voluntary manslaughter to male defendants).
Additionally, while the notion that women are the property of their husbands is far less
pervasive throughout American society than in other cultures, there is still a sense that
American men have power over their wives’ “sexual and reproductive capacities.”
Serran & Firestone, supra note 26, at 3. It seems safe to say, then, that “ ‘men around
the world [still] think and talk about women and marriage in proprietary terms.’ ” Id.
(citation omitted).
61. Lewin, supra note 1, at A18.
62. Id.
63. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1698.
64. Id.
65. See Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1339 (1997) (discussing how the O.J. Simpson trial led
journalist Susan Estritch to call for legislatures to abolish the heat of passion defense
because of the considerable disadvantages it imposes on women).
66. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1694.
67. Holmes v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1946] A.C. 588.
68. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1694 (discussing how the “honor defense” allowed courts
to simply acquit a male defendant who killed in the heat of passion caused by learning of
his wife’s adultery).
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assault.69 These narrow categories were created by judges who had the
propensities of the average adult male in mind.70 In some states, a hus-
band’s killing of his adulterous wife upon discovering her in bed
with another man was considered justifiable homicide until as late as
the 1970s.71 Although the modern conception of voluntary manslaugh-
ter makes no specific reference to gender and purports to be gender
neutral, the doctrine cannot escape its clear gendered roots.72
Today, voluntary manslaughter often mitigates the sentence of a
homicide that would otherwise be murder73 when the homicide is com-
mitted due to an “extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which
there is reasonable explanation or excuse.” 74 The justification for the
partial defense provided by voluntary manslaughter is that an individ-
ual who kills while under the influence of intense emotional or mental
disturbance is “less deserving of punishment than” someone who com-
mits premeditated murder.75 Accordingly, those who kill in the heat of
passion are treated as lacking the requisite malice.76 This reduces the
individual’s culpability in the eyes of the law.77 Additionally, in cases
of voluntary manslaughter, a degree of culpability is assigned to the
victim as the provoker, in order to justify the reduced sentence.78 The
69. Nourse, supra note 65, at 1341. These four categories, referred to as the “ ‘nine-
teenth century four,’ ” found justification in the traditional male code of honor. Id. at 1340-
41 (internal quotation omitted).
70. See Keller, supra note 5, at 266-69 (describing the role that judicial discretion plays
in sentencing defendants). Keller argues that the clearest explanation for disparate sen-
tencing of men and women “is the negative bias against women held by a large number of
judges.” Id. at 267.
71. Lewin, supra note 1, at A18. For example, until 1974, Texas viewed a violent
revenge by a “victimized” husband on his adulterous wife as justified in the eyes of the law.
Serran & Firestone, supra note 26, at 3.
72. See Burke, supra note 12, at 1061-62 (comparing the lack of gender neutrality in
the application of the crime of voluntary manslaughter to similar shortcomings in the uti-
lization of the concepts of “retreat and imminence in the self-defense context”).
73. The Model Penal Code classifies voluntary manslaughter as a second-degree felony.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962).
74. Id.
75. Burke, supra note 12, at 1060.
76. See, e.g., People v. Najera, 138 Cal. App. 4th 212, 215, 220 (2006) (explaining that,
in cases of voluntary manslaughter, a complete lack of malice is not assumed, but a defen-
dant found to have acted in the heat of passion is said to have lacked the malice necessary
for murder). Most United States jurisdictions divide murder into two degrees. First-degree
murder requires a defendant’s premeditation and deliberation, whereas second-degree
murder is categorized by the absence of these two elements. Taylor, supra note 35, at
1683. Further, “[i]f the absence of premeditation and deliberation stems from a total loss
of self-control caused by adequate provocation by the victim, and if the defendant killed
without an opportunity to cool off or regain control, then the homicide is classified as vol-
untary manslaughter.” Id. (citation omitted).
77. Burke, supra note 12, at 1060.
78. The victim is said to share in the liability for the provoked murderous act. Taylor,
supra note 35, at 1720.
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adulterous actions of unfaithful wives have been treated as “especially
provoking” and deserving of shared culpability.79
Voluntary manslaughter80 is categorized by the presence of
serious provocation.81 Notably, the common law as codified by some
states and the Model Penal Code differ as to how “reasonableness”
should be judged.82 According to the Model Penal Code, a homicide is
categorized as manslaughter if it “is committed under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable
explanation or excuse.” 83 Thus, the Model Penal Code takes a more
subjective and nuanced approach, judging reasonableness “from the
viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances
as he believes them to be.” 84 Conversely, the common law has devel-
oped a more objective approach, which uses a “reasonable person”
standard to determine the adequacy of provocation. In Georgia, a
state that has adopted the common law approach,
A person commits the offense of voluntary manslaughter when he
causes the death of another human being under circumstances
which would otherwise be murder and if he acts solely as the result
of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious
provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable
person . . . .85
Under the common law approach, the key element is that the provoca-
tion must have been sufficient to cause a reasonable man to lose his
sense of self-control.86 The common law standard does not ask if a rea-
79. Id. at 1721-22.
80. There are four elements of heat of passion: “ ‘(1) adequate provocation; (2) a passion
or emotion such as fear, terror, anger, rage or resentment; (3) [the] homicide occurred
while the passion still existed and before a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool;
and (4) a causal connection between the provocation, passion, and homicide.’ ” JOSEPH
G. COOK ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 546 (6th ed. 2008) (quoting Hogan v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 1297,
1308 (10th Cir. 1999)).
81. Id. at 545.
82. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2(a) (West 2010) (adopting an objective common
law standard of reasonableness) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962) (defining
reasonableness under a subjective approach that considers the individual actor’s
circumstances).
83. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962).
84. Id.
85. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2 (West 2009).
86. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 653 (2d ed. 1986). It is
important to note that it is not the duration of the provocation that is determinative;
rather, it is the intensity of the provocation that must be measured using a reasonable man
standard. See People v. Wharton, 53 Cal. 3d 522, 570 (1991) (concluding that although the
two-week period of torment by the defendant’s wife may have been sufficient to justify a
heat-of-passion instruction, the instruction was not appropriate given the long duration
of the provocation.).
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sonable man would kill in such a situation,87 as killing is rarely viewed
as legally justifiable.88 Instead, the law treats the provoked homicide
as an understandable response89 deserving of less severe punishment.90
Objective reasonableness, on the other hand, simply looks at the defen-
dant’s actions and asks if the provocation would be sufficient to trigger
the same heat of passion response in the reasonable person.91
Many modern categories of provocation have their roots in the En-
glish common law system.92 For example, English courts found ade-
quate evidence of provocation when the provoker made a physical
assault or threat, or when the provoker’s actions were unlawful or
deemed immoral.93 Allowances for provocation caused by immoral acts
applied specifically to the actions of adulterous wives.94 American
courts later adopted these categories, which became the foundation
of the common law formulation of reasonableness and adequate
provocation.95
Common law has since expanded from the rigidity of the “nine-
teenth century four” categories of adequate provocation.96 Most ques-
tions regarding adequate provocation now go to the jury.97 The trend
to put these decisions in the hands of the jury has been described as
follows: “rigid definitions of provocation have given way to a general-
ized ‘reasonable person’ standard of provocation that jurors are
87. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 86, at 654.
88. Id. Provocation is rarely regarded as a justification and is usually treated as an
excuse. Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical Assess-
ment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation
Cases, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 22 (1998).
89. Heller, supra note 88, at 22; Taylor, supra note 35, at 1687.
90. Heller, supra note 88, at 23.
91. Burke, supra note 12, at 1047. The fundamental inquiry is whether the defendant
was provoked “to such an extent as would render ordinary men of average disposition
liable to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather
than from judgment.” People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 780 (Cal. 1976) (quoting People v.
Logan, 164 P. 1121, 1123 (Cal. 1917)).
92. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1686-88. Today, though the modern common law doctrine
of voluntary manslaughter remains very similar in England and the United States, the
doctrine has proven difficult to apply to other cultures and societies. Id.
93. In the seventeenth century, the doctrine of adequate provocation was seen as a way
to rebut the element of malice under the theory “that the cause of the killing lay not in
some secret hatred or design in the breast of the slayer but rather in provocation given by
the deceased which inflamed the slayer’s passions.” A. J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provo-
cation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292, 292-93 (1976).
94. Id. at 294.
95. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1686.
96. Nourse, supra note 65, at 1341.
97. People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 780 (Cal. 1976). The Ohio Supreme Court has
attempted to provide some guidelines concerning when a voluntary manslaughter jury
instruction should be given. In Shane v. State, 590 N.E.2d 272, 274 (Ohio 1992), the
court stated that such a jury instruction is only proper “when the evidence presented at
trial would reasonably support both an acquittal on the charged crime of murder and a
conviction for voluntary manslaughter.”
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entrusted to apply.” 98 Modern common law, however, continues to
view certain categories of provocation as inherently unreasonable.
The most notable of these categories is provocation alleged to have
been brought on by mere words or other verbal provocation.99 The ma-
jority position throughout common law jurisdictions is that words
alone cannot constitute adequate provocation.100 Many state courts
have held that because verbal provocation does not constitute an im-
mediate assault on one’s person or property, mere words—no matter
how offensive or insulting—will not furnish adequate provocation for
homicide.101 In such jurisdictions, words are insufficient justification
for murder as a matter of law, which means that the jury is not given
a chance to determine the reasonableness of the response for the pur-
poses of adequate provocation and voluntary manslaughter.102
A minority of jurisdictions are, however, beginning to shy away
from this bright line rule by allowing juries to consider voluntary man-
slaughter in cases involving verbal provocation.103 This reflects the
approach of the Model Penal Code, which focuses on subjective
98. Burke, supra note 12, at 1060. The jury’s crucial role sheds light on the potential
negative impact of both gender bias in the selection of jurors and jurors’ reliance on gender
stereotypes in cases of voluntary manslaughter. See discussion supra Part I.
99. See Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718, 722 (Md. 1991) (“ ‘[I]nsulting words or
gestures, no matter how opprobrious, do not amount to an affray, and standing alone, do
not constitute adequate provocation.’ ” (quoting Sims v. State, 573 A.2d 1317, 1322-23
(Md. 1990))). Words can constitute adequate provocation, however, if they are accom-
panied by conduct indicating a clear intention to cause harm. Id.
100. Id.; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 86, at 655 (“[I]t is often held that a reasonable
man may be provoked into a passion when he . . . is hurt by violent physical blows, or
is unlawfully arrested or discovers his spouse in the act of adultery; but that he can
never be provoked by mere words . . . .”). There has been a tendency for the law of
voluntary manslaughter to attempt to provide categories of what constitutes reasonable
provocation. Id.
101. See, e.g., People v. Chevalier, 544 N.E.2d 942, 944 (Ill. 1989) (discussing the rule
that no matter how aggravated, abusive, or indecent, mere words are insufficient provoca-
tion to allow for a mitigated sentence of voluntary manslaughter); State v. Castro, 592
P.2d 185, 187 (N.M. 1979) (holding that the provocative words uttered by the victim
during a phone call with the defendant did not, as a matter of law, constitute adequate
provocation).
102. In such jurisdictions, words are insufficient provocation as a matter of law, so cases
in which the sole provocation at issue is verbal do not go to the jury. Girouard, 583 A.2d
at 722-23 (explaining that words, no matter how offensive, are insufficient to reduce
homicide from murder to manslaughter).
103. COOK ET AL., supra note 80, at 555. This approach is more in keeping with the
Model Penal Code, which avoids making bright line rules regarding reasonableness by
requiring consideration of the mindset of the individual at the time of the killing. Id. See
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 86, at 655 (“In modern times, however, there seems to be
a growing realization that what might or might not cause a loss of self-control in a rea-
sonable Englishman of a century ago might not necessarily produce the same reaction in
the reasonable Anglo-American of today.”). Scholars predict the continuation of the “trend
away from the usual practice of placing the various types of provocatory conduct into
pigeon-holes.” Id.
262 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:249
reasonableness and requires examination of the individual’s actual
motivations.104
Both the common law and relevant statutes further narrow the
scope of voluntary manslaughter by disallowing any meaningful
cooling-off period between the provocation and the homicide.105
Accordingly, the defendant must have killed before he had time to
process the provocation and calm down.106 Under the modern common
law conception of voluntary manslaughter, the defendant must demon-
strate: reasonable provocation; that he or she was, in fact, provoked;
that a reasonable individual would not have cooled off between the pro-
vocation and the homicide; and that the defendant did not cool off
during this lapse of time.107 Many state statutes have incorporated this
no-cooling-off requirement.108 This constraint is justified by the notion
that after a reasonable period of time, provoked individuals are
expected to have had a chance to calm down and gather their
thoughts.109 Under the common law, any killing that occurs after a
period of reflection is presumed to have been committed with premedi-
tation and deliberation.110
Conversely, the Model Penal Code does not contain any language
requiring that the defendant not have had a cooling-off period in cases
of heat of passion voluntary manslaughter.111 This is because “ ‘[a]n
104. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962).
105. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2(a) (West 2010). Georgia’s statute provides that if
there is “an interval between the provocation and the killing sufficient for the voice of
reason and humanity to be heard . . . the killing shall be attributed to deliberate revenge
and be punished as murder,” instead of as voluntary manslaughter. Id. Other states’
statutes have adopted similar wording. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-3(a)(2) (LEXISNEXIS
2010) (stating that the act must occur before a reasonable cooling-off( period); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 707.4 (West 2010) (emphasizing that there must not be an interval of time
“between the provocation and the killing in which a person of ordinary reason and temper-
ment would regain control and suppress the impulse to kill”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14.31(A)(1) (2009) (explaining that there must not be a period of time for a person to cool
between the provocation and the homicide).
106. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 86, at 667 (explaining that under the majority
objective reasonableness standard, a defendant will be found to have cooled off if a rea-
sonable amount of time lapsed, even if the defendant had not, in fact, cooled off at the time
of the killing). Similarly, if a defendant actually cooled off quickly following provocation,
he may not claim the defense of voluntary manslaughter just because the “reasonable
person” would not have been cool and calm at the time of the killing. Id. at 663. In this
way, the common law objective standard does, to some extent, take into account the mind-
set of each defendant.
107. Hogan v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 1297, 1308 (10th Cir. 1999). See also Taylor, supra note
35, at 1687 (laying out similar components for the heat of passion defense).
108. Burke, supra note 12, at 1047; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 86, at 661.
109. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 86, at 663.
110. See Sheppard v. State, 10 So. 2d 822, 824 (Ala. 1942) (“[T]he law says the injured
husband must reflect, must not brood over his hurt, then slay the wife or her paramour.
If he does, he is guilty of murder.”).
111. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1962) (failing to address whether the defendant
must have acted without first having had time to cool).
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action influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance is not one that
is necessarily so spontaneously undertaken. Rather, it may be that a
significant mental trauma has affected a defendant’s mind for a sub-
stantial period of time, simmering in the unknowing subconscious and
then inexplicably coming to the fore.’ ” 112
Due to these differences in the legal limitations and treatment of
those convicted of voluntary manslaughter under the Model Penal
Code and common law approaches, the standard adopted by each state
may significantly affect how a voluntary manslaughter case proceeds
in a given jurisdiction. In recent years, states have begun to adopt the
Model Penal Code’s subjective standard in provocation cases.113 Still,
many states have chosen to retain the common law approach by con-
tinuing to rely on an objective reasonableness approach.114 More impor-
tant is the fact that though precise statutory language varies from
state to state, the “reasonable person” remains a key concept in the
law of voluntary manslaughter.115
III. REASONABLENESS AND VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
Whether the objective common law approach or the Model Penal
Code’s subjective approach is used, the concept of reasonableness is
central to the law of voluntary manslaughter.116 Interestingly, no
matter the approach actually adopted by a particular state, when
jurors are asked to envision “the reasonable person,” it is assumed that
they conjure up an image of the average person who is statistically
similar to most other people.117 Some experts posit, however, that
112. People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d 668, 676 (1980) (quoting People v. Patterson, 39
N.Y.2d 288, 303 (1976)).
113. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(1)(B) (West 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
54a(a) (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 641 (2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(a)
(Consol. 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.118(1)(b) (2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §  163.135(1)
(West 2009); see also State v. Dumlao, 715 P.2d 822, 828, 830-31 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986)
(adopting a subjective view of emotional disturbance and stressing that reasonableness of
perception does not equal accuracy of perception).
114.  E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(2) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2(a) (West
2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:31(1) (2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20(1) (West 2009);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.050(1) (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4(b)(2) (West
2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205.5(4) (West 2010). Common statutory language in the
laws of these jurisdictions indicates that the provocation or excuse must be reasonable
or adequate to provoke the passions of the reasonable or ordinary person and does not
mention the actual actor.
115. The Model Penal Code also uses the term “reasonableness,” which is determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he
believes them to be, as opposed to relying on an objective societal view of reasonable
conduct, as does the common law. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962).
116. Id.
117. See Burke, supra note 12, at 1047 (describing the empirical notion of
reasonableness used in defense law, which “ask[s] jurors to decide what a typical person
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jurors’ “reasonable person” does not accurately reflect the average
person, but rather, serves as a personification of a community ideal of
reasonable behavior.118 This creates “an objective and largely unitary
standard” that may seem gender neutral but, in reality, has clear gen-
dered roots.119
The concept of reasonableness, then, is itself characterized by
idealized—and genderized—notions of reality.120 Both objective and
subjective reasonableness add to this distorted reality by presenting
their own sets of respective gender issues that have been largely
minimized or ignored by the legal community.121 The primary dif-
ference between objective and subjective reasonableness lies in the
extent to which the jury is permitted to consider a defendant’s indi-
vidual characteristics.122
Objective reasonableness is inextricably tied to the purportedly
gender-neutral “reasonable person” standard.123 Many American courts
have adopted the objective reasonableness standard to accommodate
the belief that the law should be based upon a standard of conduct
that is generally accepted.124 Theoretically, there is an element of jus-
tice in an objective standard that holds all members of a community to
the same standard,125 but this advantage is neutralized by the
would have believed, felt, or done in the defendant’s circumstances” and addressing the
argument that this is “the sole measure of reasonableness”).
118. Mark A. Rothstein, The Impact of Behavioral Genetics on the Law and the Courts,
83 JUDICATURE 116, 118 (1999) (contending that “[t]he hypothetical reasonable person is
not the average person . . . but the personification of a community ideal of reasonable
behavior”); cf. Heller, supra note 88, at 17-18 (explaining that, in self-defense cases, jurors
must be biased to the norms of their communities in order to “[e]nforc[e] the conscience
of the community”).
119. Rothstein, supra note 118, at 118 (discussing how the reasonable person standard
was once the reasonable man standard); Taylor, supra note 35, at 1689-92 (“Rather than
developing a separate standard for women, criminal law has held and continues to hold
female defendants to a male standard of reasonableness.”).
120. See Nourse, supra note 65, at 1387 (“[T]he law’s technique, its personification of
the defense, leads quite naturally to the feminist argument that the law asks questions
about men to define gender.”).
121. E.g., Taylor, supra note 35, at 1689 (stating that the homosexual male receives no
separate consideration under the objective “reasonable man” standard).
122. Burke, supra note 12, at 1051. Naturally, subjective reasonableness allows the
decision-maker to consider more of the defendant’s personal characteristics when
determining reasonable behavior. Id. at 1043; Heller, supra note 88, at 4.
123. Many statutes make direct reference to the “reasonable person.” See supra note 114
and accompanying text (identifying several statutes that include the concept of reason-
ableness and the reasonable person in the statutory language).
124. See Heller, supra note 88, at 4 (evaluating the argument “that subjective standards
of reasonableness are antithetical to” certain fundamental standards of criminal law).
125. Id. at 9 (noting that the American legal system was founded on the idea that apply-
ing the law justly means applying the same general rule to different cases and
defendants).
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standard’s lack of meaningful objectivity and equality in the way in
which it is applied.126
Despite a facade of neutrality, the supposed “reasonable person”
standard cannot escape its gendered roots in the tradition of the rea-
sonable man:127 the “reasonable man” standard that first emerged in
England in the middle of the nineteenth century birthed the “reason-
able person” standard.128 The history of the “reasonable man” standard
reveals centuries of discrimination towards women.129 It was com-
monly held that the standard did not apply to female defendants, who
were thought to be incapable of reasonable, rational thought.130 Instead
of developing a new standard free from a history of sex discrimination
and free of gendered language,131 the legal community continues to
hold females to a standard of reasonableness clearly rooted in the male
experience.132 As a result, women have no real place in either the past
or the present of the reasonable person standard.133
Not only is objective reasonableness not inherently gender-neu-
tral, judges and jurors add to the problem by relying on their own gen-
der prejudices and stereotypes in applying the standard to criminal
defendants.134 Even though society has progressed in its views of the
marital relationship, thousands of years of viewing women as the mar-
ital property of their husbands is not easily erased.135 This culturally
ingrained tradition of male dominance and ownership may lead jurors
to find a woman’s act of adultery more “provoking,” than adultery
126. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1690 (contending that the seemingly gender-neutral “rea-
sonable person” standard “masks a profoundly gender-based and sex-specific standard”).
127. Id. at 1691.
128. Rothstein, supra note 118, at 118.
129. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1691.
130. Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32, 41-42 (1873) (“No one would ordinarily expect, and
the defendant had no right to expect, from a young woman thus situated . . . the same de-
gree of competency, which he would expect of ordinary men under like circumstances . . . .”).
Indeed, “[t]here is not a single common-law reference to a ‘reasonable woman.’ ” Taylor,
supra note 35, at 1690.
131. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, in FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 61-63 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993) (arguing that the rea-
sonable man standard cannot be de-genderized by merely changing the word “man” to
“person”; there must also be change to the underlying male model upon which the stan-
dard is based). Even basic linguistics show the extent of women’s exclusion under the
standard, as “ ‘man’ does not include ‘woman,’ nor are the terms interchangeable.” Taylor,
supra note 35, at 1691-92 (citation omitted).
132. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1691.
133. Id.
134. Keller, supra note 5, at 268 (noting that gender prejudices and stereotypes are
often pervasive in the judicial decision-making process and can even impact the outcome
of a case). See also Burke, supra note 12, at 1045-46 (discussing juror reliance on biased
social norms).
135. Though antiquated, the view that women are men’s sexual property lingers even
in today’s common law. Miller, supra note 24, at 672.
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committed by a husband.136 Jurors may not even be aware of their own
gender biases, because such biases are deeply ingrained in societal
norms.137 Such cultural biases lead, however, to disparate application
of the already male-biased objective reasonableness standard.138
In addition to the problems of inherent gender prejudice, the
whole idea of trying to accommodate the behavior of men and women
into one simplistic standard ignores the fact that criminal behavior
is not gender neutral.139 In particular, research indicates that men and
women react differently to spousal infidelity.140 This identifiable differ-
ence in reaction means that male behavior will be treated as the norm;
though the law purports to be neutral, it often actually favors the male
experience by conflating it with the human experience.141 Ultimately,
female defendants fall victim to a legal theory that makes no attempt
to accommodate or even understand the female experience.142 As one
scholar argues: “[a]sking a woman to behave as a reasonable man
places her violent behavior—when it does not comport with a male
norm—outside the boundaries of reason.” 143
An objective standard based on the behavior of men clearly makes
it difficult to judge women equitably.144 Perhaps more troubling is the
fact that because gender discrimination underlying the common law
notion of “objective” reasonableness is hidden behind a facade of
gender-neutral language, detection of the true discriminatory nature
136. Jurors are far more willing to view homicide committed by men as having been rea-
sonable when triggered by female infidelity. Burke, supra note 12, at 1045. See also Taylor,
supra note 35, at 1721 (asserting that the law of voluntary manslaughter “has always con-
sidered a woman’s act of adultery especially provoking”).
137. See Ridgeway & Correll, supra note 9, at 510 (describing the theory among scholars
that “gender is an institutionalized system of social practices for constituting people as
two significantly different categories, men and women, and organizing social relations
of inequality on the basis of that difference”).
138. See Burke, supra note 12, at 1045 (theorizing that juror reliance on biased social
norms allows male defendants to invoke the claim of provocation more successfully than
female defendants).
139. Studies of intimate homicide reveal that men and women kill under different cir-
cumstances and with different motives. Id. at 1062; Serran & Firestone, supra note 26,
at 2.
140. Serran & Firestone, supra note 26, at 3 (noting that this may be because infidelity
has distinct consequences for men). For example, it may raise uncertainty as to the pater-
nity of any children born, which may then lead to escalated frustration and violence. Id.
This male desire to control female reproductive capacities may be one reason the law of
voluntary manslaughter and adequate provocation has long recognized and accommodated
the male struggle against female infidelity. Id.
141. MacKinnon, supra note 17, at 658 (“When [the state] is most ruthlessly neutral, it
will be most male . . . .”).
142. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1691-92.
143. Id. at 1692.
144. Id. at 1725.
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is prevented.145 Whereas laws that are more noticeably discriminatory
are quick to raise public concern, the concept of objective reasonable-
ness hides the fact that women are largely treated as the unprotected
“other.” 146 A closer look reveals both the widespread social acceptance
of male violence against women who stray from their “duty” to honor
their husbands,147 and the law’s willingness to grant leniency to men
who retaliate against their unfaithful wives, but not to women who kill
their adulterous husbands.148
Subjective reasonableness, as adopted by the Model Penal Code,149
provides an increasingly popular alternative to the common law’s ob-
jective reasonableness standard.150 The Model Penal Code conception
of voluntary manslaughter “was designed to sweep away ‘the rigid
rules that have developed with respect to the sufficiency of particular
types of provocation, such as the rule that words alone can never be
enough.’ ” 151 Adopted by several states,152 this standard judges the rea-
sonableness of one’s explanation or excuse “from the viewpoint of a
person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes
them to be.”153 This approach furthers the Model Penal Code’s general
requirement of inquiring into the defendant’s mindset to ascertain
whether he or she had the requisite mens rea, and to determine appro-
priate punishment.154
Unlike the rarely used pure subjective standard,155 the Model Pe-
nal Code actually incorporates a basic level of objectivity by requiring
145. Id. at 1690. See also Burke, supra note 12, at 1062 (“[T]he adultery-provocation
doctrine purported to be gender-neutral, but had an unquestionably disparate impact
by gender.”).
146. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1683, 1687 (acknowledging that, from the inception of the
reasonableness standard, the law “has referred to one sex only”: the “reasonable man”)
(emphasis added).
147. For statistics indicating the stark contrast between the number of female and male
victims of intimate violence in America, see Homicide Trends, supra note 35.
148. Keller, supra note 5, at 272-73.
149. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962).
150. In recent years, states have begun to embrace the Model Penal Code’s approach.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
151. People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d 668, 679 (1980) (citation omitted). See also Nourse,
supra note 65, at 1339 (“The Model Penal Code (MPC) represents the height of the liberal
reform movement and the culmination of the law’s move away from categorical rules.”).
152. Heller, supra note 88, at 69.
153. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962).
154. See Leah Durland, Comment, Overcoming the Persecutor Bar: Applying a Pur-
poseful Mens Rea Requirement to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 571, 591
(2009) (discussing the Model Penal Code’s widely followed formulation of mens rea).
155. Heller, supra note 88, at 69. It should be noted that there are different conceptions
of subjective reasonableness, each of which controls for different factors. See id. at 54-55
(discussing the emergence of new subjective standards and the purely subjective stan-
dard). However, as these other approaches are less commonly used, they will not be con-
sidered in this Note.
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that the defendant’s provoked response also be objectively reasonable,
though the reasonableness of that response is analyzed under the cir-
cumstances as the defendant believed them to be at the time he or she
acted.156 It follows that in order to qualify under the doctrine of volun-
tary manslaughter, provoked actions must be objectively reasonable
at their core.157 The only place where subjectivity comes into play is in
determining the defendant’s perceptions of the circumstances, not in
assessing the reasonableness of the resulting emotional response.158
Application of the Model Penal Code’s approach requires the
finder of fact to ask two basic questions: 1) how did the defendant per-
ceive the situation?; and 2) did the defendant respond reasonably
based on his or her perceptions?159 In order for the defendant’s actions
to fall under the protections of the doctrine of voluntary manslaugh-
ter, the defendant’s perception of the situation must have caused him
or her to “act under extreme emotional disturbance.” 160
It is often not possible for the trier of fact, particularly a jury, to
fully understand and appreciate a defendant’s unique perceptions as
they are called to do under the subjective approach.161 Jurors are
forced to rely on certain key, distinguishable features present in all
individuals to help them surmise how the defendant felt and per-
ceived the situation.162 Gender is one of the key features most pre-
sumed to influence greatly individuals’ general perceptions of the
world and their reactions in specific situations.163
As previously discussed, the Model Penal Code approach is not a
purely subjective standard, as its application requires consideration
of the objective reasonableness of the defendant’s “explanation or ex-
cuse.” 164 Under the Model Penal Code approach highlighted in
Casassa, jurors are not meant to consider each individual trait and
156. Id. at 68.
157. Id. (“Perceptions do not have to be objectively reasonable under the MPC standard;
reactions to perceptions, however, still do.”).
158. Id. at 68-69.
159. Id.
160. People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d 668, 678-79 (1980).
161. See Miller, supra note 24, at 678 (highlighting the problem of “jury confusion”
resulting from the hybrid subjective-objective Model Penal Code approach). Miller
discusses a case where, at the trial for a man charged with killing another man over a
parking spot, the jury sent a note to the judge asking him to clarify the standard for
evaluating reasonableness. Id.
162. See Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d at 680 (rejecting the idea that the trier of fact can and
should consider all the idiosyncratic characteristics of an individual and holding that
some personal traits and feelings, such as those stemming from a mental disability, are
too peculiar to be worthy of mitigating force).
163. See Ridgeway & Correll, supra note 9, at 511 (explaining that gender beliefs about
men and women are at the core of our cultural and our social structure).
164. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962); Heller, supra note 88, at 68.
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idiosyncrasy of a defendant.165 Yet when jurors attempt to analyze the
reasonableness of a defendant’s actions “ ‘from the viewpoint of a per-
son in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defen-
dant believed them to be,’ ” 166 they must have a manageable way to
place themselves in the defendant’s shoes.167 One of the easiest ways
for jurors to do this is to take into account the defendant’s gender.
How gender is believed to influence one’s perceptions and thought
process will accordingly nearly always play a role in the reasonable-
ness analysis.168
Other obvious characteristics, such as age and race, are also rela-
tively easy to determine and, like gender, carry with them readily iden-
tifiable stereotypes.169 Gender categorization is unique though, as it
serves as the foundation of our society’s structure.170 Gender can be
distinguished from age or race because gender is dichotomous: there
are only two sexes, each with clearly defined gender parameters.171
This is a dichotomy in which the male perspective and experience is
165. See Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d at 680 (distinguishing those normal individual traits that
the jury should consider from those which are too “peculiar”). But see Heller, supra note
88, at 69 (arguing that “the MPC standard’s category of ‘reasonable’ self-defensive and
provoked acts encompasses any act that a reasonable person with the defendant’s unique
perceptions would have committed” (emphasis added)).
166. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d at 678 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney
1998)).
167. See Miller, supra note 24, at 678 (explaining that juries find it difficult to
understand the “balance between the objective and subjective inquiries into a defendant’s
perception of the alleged affront”).
168. Studies show that widely held gender beliefs do exist in our contemporary society.
The holders of these beliefs ascribe certain stereotypical characteristics to individual
men and women based solely on their gender. See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of
(Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from
Perceived Status and Competence, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 878, 880 (2002)
(analyzing paternalistic stereotypes); Lloyd B. Lueptow et al., Social Change and the
Persistence of Sex Typing: 1974-1997, 80 SOC. FORCES 1, 2 (2001) (assessing the impli-
cations of change and stability in sex typing through study of measures of femininity and
masculinity); Janet T. Spence & Camille E. Buckner, Instrumental and Expressive
Traits, Trait Stereotypes, and Sexist Attitudes: What do They Signify?, 24 PSYCHOL.
WOMEN Q. 44 (2000) (exploring college students’ self-perceptions, gender attitudes, and
sexist stereotypes).
169. See Fiske et al., supra note 168, at 879-80 (discussing various levels of stereo-
typing along race, gender, and age lines).
170. Ridgeway & Correll, supra note 9, at 511 (“Widely held gender beliefs are in effect
cultural rules or instructions for enacting the social structure of . . . inequality that we
understand to be gender . . . . Thus, while cultural beliefs about gender are indeed stereo-
types, they have a substantially broader social significance than our common under-
standing of the phrase suggests.”).
171. See id. at 513 (“[A]bstracted, hegemonic understandings of men and women are
roughly consensual in that virtually everyone in the society knows what they are and
likely expects that most others hold these beliefs.”).
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granted superiority.172 Conversely, stereotypes involving race and age
do not fit neatly into just two distinct hierarchical categories.173
Ultimately, when jurors try to perceive things as the defendant
would have in order to determine the reasonableness of his or her
actions, it is likely that the gender of the defendant plays a particularly
large role in shaping the jurors’ perceptions.174 Under the Model Penal
Code approach, therefore, jurors are likely to ascribe gender stereo-
types to a female defendant when asking if the defendant acted as a
reasonable person would have in the defendant’s situation.175 Underly-
ing this inquiry lies the question of whether a “reasonable woman”
would, or rather, should experience extreme emotional disturbance,
as defined under the doctrine of adequate provocation, as a result of
discovering her husband’s infidelity.176
Male acts of aggression in response to spousal infidelity have long
been considered reasonable under the doctrine of voluntary man-
slaughter,177 and male defendants have long received greater protec-
tions under the law of voluntary manslaughter, in part due to the
societal belief that spousal infidelity is more shameful for a man than
it is for a woman.178 On the other hand, the act of a wife killing her
unfaithful spouse during a fit of rage is a far less common and
172. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1691.
173. Id. at 514 (“[R]esearch demonstrates that male or female is usually the first
category that people sort self and other into in social relational contexts, possibly because
it is a simple, binary classification while other classifications are usually more complex.”).
For articles discussing the nature and impact of race and age stereotypes and class-
ifications, see Candice P. Holliday, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967:
Issues Litigated at the Supreme Court Level, 84 FLA. BAR J. 20 (2010), available at http://
www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNJournal01.nsf/; Angela James, Making Sense of Race
and Racial Classification, 4 RACE & SOC’Y 235 (2001); Kristen A. Myers & Passion
Williamson, Race Talk: The Perpetuation of Racism Through Private Discourse, 4 RACE
& SOC’Y 3 (2001).
174. Burke, supra note 12, at 1079-80 (“[S]tereotypes can affect jury decisionmaking
whenever reasonableness is part of the doctrinal landscape.”). For example, women are
generally “seen as less competent” but “ ‘nicer’ and better at communal tasks.” Ridgeway
& Correll, supra note 9, at 513.
175. Cf. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1692 (“Asking a woman to behave as a reasonable man
places her violent behavior—when it does not comport with a male norm—outside the
boundaries of reason.”).
176. Ridgeway & Correll, supra note 9, at 513, 519. There is support for the idea that
men and women are grouped into two distinct gendered categories in which the pre-
vailing gender stereotypes are then projected onto all individuals in that category. Those
who do not comport with their prescribed gender stereotype are treated as abnormal and
threatening to one’s social standing. Id.
177. The typical paradigm in heat of passion cases is presented in Peacock. Lewin, supra
note 1, at A18.
178. Burke, supra note 12, at 1077-78. The level of shame felt as a result of a spouse’s
infidelity may be viewed as affecting a defendant’s level of emotional disturbance, which
then serves as the gauge for the existence of adequate provocation under the doctrine of
voluntary manslaughter. Id.
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acceptable occurrence.179 This can partially be attributed to the fact
that women “are not socialized to express their anger through aggres-
sion.” 180 Instead, women are taught not to be surprised by male infidel-
ity, and to respond to their husbands’ indiscretions in a less violent
manner than would be expected from husbands discovering their
wives’ infidelities.181
Under the standard application of the subjective Model Penal
Code approach, gender is presumed to affect women’s perceptions of
what is reasonable, so the answer to the question of whether a woman
has acted reasonably is often based on gender stereotypes.182 As an
initial matter, female homicide defendants do not, and cannot, conform
to gender stereotypes, as homicide is a “male” crime.183 Accordingly,
a woman who kills in the heat of passion has strayed much further
from social norms than men who kill under similar circumstances.184
The history of the doctrine of voluntary manslaughter serves as a
protective measure for men “provoked” to kill by their unfaithful
wives and completely excludes the female experience.185 Women who
kill are already outliers, and women who kill in the heat of passion fall
even further outside gender and societal norms.186 Though studies
have been inconclusive on this point, this different view of men and
women murderers may result in the imposition of more severe penal-
ties on women who kill in the heat of passion.187 This is not to say that
all jurors are inherently sexist in their application of the law, but most
seem to be influenced by the prevalence of gender stereotypes in
modern society.188
179. See Taylor, supra note 35, at 1698 (describing women’s place in the typical volun-
tary manslaughter paradigm as the adulterer, undeserving of sympathy, as opposed to as
the enraged, provoked, and justified male spouse).
180. Miller, supra note 24, at 680. For articles that compare male and female stereo-
typical traits in more depth, see Michael M. Conway et al., Status, Communality, and
Agency: Implications for Stereotypes of Gender and Other Groups, 71 J.  PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 25 (1996), and Fiske et al., supra note 168, at 878-80.
181. Miller, supra note 24, at 669. Women are taught to respect their husbands and be
loyal in their relationships; men are conceived as being “prone to infidelity.” Id.
182. See id. (arguing that because of these stereotypes, women are less likely to benefit
to the Model Penal Code’s approach to subjective reasonableness).
183. Again, men are almost ten times more likely than women to commit murder.
Homicide Trends, supra note 35.
184. Miller, supra note 24, at 681.
185. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1698.
186. Miller, supra note 24, at 669-70.
187. See Taylor, supra note 35, at 1732 (discussing how a woman whose experience and
reaction differs from that of most other women may actually be penalized by a sub-
jective double standard).
188. Jurors often cannot escape exposure to gender stereotypes, as such stereotypes
“are institutionalized in the media, government policy, [and] normative images of the
family.” Ridgeway & Correll, supra note 9, at 513. See also Burke, supra note 12, at 1053
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In its application, the Model Penal Code approach of limited sub-
jectivity is not as progressive or gender-sensitive as it may initially
appear.189 It is true, however, that the subjective approach does avoid
the facade of gender neutrality inherent in the objective approach,
which really just masks the conflation of the male experience with
the human experience.190 The subjective approach reflects the notion
“that sensitivity to the genders of the victim and the offender is neces-
sary to avoid equating male behavior with human behavior, and thus
too easily excusing the killing of women by men whose gender roles
are threatened.”191 Although male behavior is not equated with human
behavior under the subjective standard, the male experience is still
preferred and normalized.192
As long as the male and female experiences are equally valued,
there is nothing inherently problematic about considering a defen-
dant’s gender as part of a reasonableness standard. The reality, how-
ever, is that the male experience has always been favored and normal-
ized.193 Adding to this bias inherent in the concept of reasonableness
is the fact that the doctrine of voluntary manslaughter was not con-
ceptualized to include women;194 rather, voluntary manslaughter was
meant to accommodate a wholly-male experience.195 Accordingly,
taking gender into account may ultimately do female defendants
who do not fit the voluntary manslaughter paradigm a disservice.196
CONCLUSION
Although both objective and subjective reasonableness are
plagued by problems of gender inequality, the Model Penal Code’s sub-
jective standard of reasonableness is “more retributively” just than
the common law’s objective reasonableness approach, which fails to
(discussing the unlikelihood of neutralizing juror bias through jury instructions); Miller,
supra note 24, at 690 (“When a jury makes its determination, its decision is inescapably
colored by the cultural bias in favor of men.”).
189. See Heller, supra note 88, at 69-71 (discussing the shortcomings of the MPC’s
limited subjectivity standard and calling for a standard that “embrace[s] a determinist
account of human perception, assuming that how an individual perceives the world is
causally determined by her personal characteristics”).
190. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1723.
191. Id.
192. Miller, supra note 24, at 690-91.
193. “Male culture is a lens through which we are all trained to see, [and] which dispro-
portionately values male experiences and perspectives,” while simultaneously devaluing
women’s beliefs and lives. Id. at 690.
194. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1689-92.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1734 (discouraging the desire to confine women’s behavior to specific
categories).
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take into account the defendant’s actual perceptions of the external
circumstances that provoked his or her homicidal act.197 Due to the ad-
vantages that applying this restrained level of subjectivity has over
applying the objective approach, the use of an even more subjective
approach may seem like an attractive option for remedying some of the
shortcomings of the Model Penal Code’s mixed subjective-objective
approach. By taking jurors’ attention away from surface character-
istics like gender, jurors may apply the heat of passion doctrine to
women more fairly than they currently do.
In practice, however, a more subjective approach may actually not
be favorable for women because the more particularly the jury defines
the relevant reasonable person under the doctrine of voluntary man-
slaughter, the more likely it will be to find a defendant’s response
reasonable.198
This is an undesirable outcome for women, as women are more
often victims in cases of spousal homicide and other intimate or sex-
related killings.199 Accordingly, an approach that treats homicide de-
fendants with leniency would have a disproportionately positive effect
on males by influencing juries to apply the doctrine of voluntary man-
slaughter more liberally with male defendants. This would result in
lesser sentences for males who commit violent crimes in the heat of
passion.200 Ultimately, a more purely-subjective standard could actu-
ally increase the rate of violence against women.201
The Model Penal Code standard is workable. The problem lies in
the fact that America’s patriarchal society values the male experience
over the female experience.202 Women who do not comport with pro-
scribed gender stereotypes, such as women who murder their hus-
bands, are seen as threatening to mainstream society and must be
controlled through legal measures.203 America’s male-dominated legal
197. Heller, supra note 88, at 86 (positing that the common law objective approach fails
to take into account an individual’s characteristics). Under the common law approach,
“[a]cts attributable to character are freely willed and nonexcusable; acts attributable to
overwhelming circumstances are determined and excusable.” Id.
198. Id. at 71. Juries applying the Model Penal Code approach are already more likely
to find a defendant’s provoked act to be reasonable compared to juries applying the objec-
tive approach. Id. Making the standard more subjective would only increase the likelihood
that a jury would find the defendant’s actions to have been reasonable.
199. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1692; Homicide Trends, supra note 35.
200. Burke, supra note 12, at 1045 (“[J]uror reliance on biased social norms permits
majority culture defendants to claim self-defense and provocation more successfully than
nonmajority defendants . . . .”).
201. See Taylor, supra note 35, at 1696 (“The law of provocation endorses men’s
ownership of women’s sexuality by expressly sanctioning violent reactions by husbands to
their wives’ infidelity.”).
202. Miller, supra note 24, at 690-91.
203. Cf. Serran & Firestone, supra note 26, at 13 (“In the case of women killing their
partners, the victims tend to initiate the violence during the homicide altercation . . . .
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system was built around a society tolerant of male violence, and no-
where are its gendered roots more noticeable than in the history of the
doctrine of voluntary manslaughter. Male violence should no longer be
treated as an inevitable fact of life, and aggression in male defendants
should not be so readily accepted as a natural reaction to attacks
against male dignity and honor. Women today have achieved gender
parity in many aspects of life, but the doctrine of voluntary manslaugh-
ter continues to perpetuate male violence as an effective means of sub-
ordinating women.204
At the same time, efforts need to be made to attempt to under-
stand female violence. Although most women who receive protection
under the doctrine of voluntary manslaughter kill in self defense,205
it may also be reasonable for women, like men, to react “offensively”
to provocation. Women who kill in the heat of passion should not be
treated as more blameworthy then their male counterparts. In order
to accomplish this gender parity, the female experience must be
incorporated into the understanding of what constitutes reasonable-
ness under voluntary manslaughter.
At a more basic level, unequal power relations promoted by gender
hierarchies encourage abuse and increase the risk of male violence
within intimate relationships.206 Patriarchy has long been accepted
and internalized by both men and women.207 Male dominance and
ascribed male superiority has its roots in American history, and the
pervasiveness of the male bias has led to complacency by both men
and women in continuing to perpetuate repressive gender stereotypes.
Accordingly, the legal community has yet to question seriously either
the standard of objective reasonableness, which equates the male ex-
perience with the human experience, or the subjective reasonable-
ness standard, which ultimately also favors the male experience.
Justifying and excusing male violence has had, and will continue
to have, dire consequences for women. As a male in a position of great
legal authority, Judge Cahill’s statement included at the beginning of
this Note is very telling. As the Peacock case illustrates, gender norms
have long dictated that corporal punishment is an appropriate and
justifiable response to female infidelity. Women must be set free
from their historical role as victims in the sexist paradigm that is the
Battered women have little reason to believe the criminal justice system will protect them.”).
204. Miller, supra note 24, at 667-68.
205. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1698.
206. Serran & Firestone, supra note 26, at 13 (“The law and the patriarchal hierarchy
have legitimized wife beating and control, resulting in unequal power relationships
between men and women.”).
207. Ridgeway & Correll, supra note 9, at 513-16 (describing how both men and women
project gender stereotypes onto themselves and onto one another).
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doctrine of voluntary manslaughter. Progressive standards alone are
clearly insufficient when their application in a gendered society
prevents meaningful equality, as is the case when women are held
to a male standard of reasonableness under the voluntary manslaugh-
ter paradigm. Until society addresses the patriarchal gender hierar-
chy, women will continue to play the dual role of deserving victim and
unprovoked assassin in the context of murders committed in the heat
of passion.
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